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The Choice-of-Law Process at a Crossroads
Robert L. Felix*
The recent case of Cipolla v. Shaposka offers a good opportunity for
examining a conflict of themes in the choice-of-law process.' Territorialism and the better rule of law are set in dramatic opposition in a
case presenting a deployment of contacts not seen before in multi-state
automobile accident cases. 2 The law-fact pattern is simple but provocative: The passenger is from Pennsylvania where local law holds a driver
accountable for ordinary negligence. The driver is from Delaware, the
place of the accident, where a guest statute holds a driver liable to a
gratuitous passenger only for gross negligence or worse. The purpose
of the trip is to take the passenger from the defendant's home in Delaware to the home of the former in Pennsylvania. The car is garaged and
insured in Delaware. The forum is Pennsylvania, the defendant having
been served after entering the state to join the plaintiff for a game of
3
golf.
The majority selects the Delaware guest statute to dispose of the
passenger's claim which fails because only ordinary negligence is evident.4 The laws of Pennsylvania and Delaware are in obvious conflict

and the analysis of the policies underlying those laws and the evaluation
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
1. Professor Ehrenzweig has discussed the relationship between the choice-of-law process
and domestic law and argued that radical changes in the choice-of-law process are influenced by dissatisfaction with domestic laws, noting particularly the current ferment in
the area of torts. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to
Cavers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1966). See also Felix, Interspousal Immunity in the Conflict
of Laws: Automobile Accident Claims, 53 CoRaNE. L. Rav. 406 (1968).
2. The only case found by the court to have a law-fact pattern nearly identical to this
one is Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968). There a Minnesota
passenger sued a North Dakota driver for personal injuries arising out of an automobile
accident in North Dakota while the parties were on a temporary pleasure trip which began
and was to end in Minnesota. Emphasizing that the driver, notwithstanding that the
automobile was insured in North Dakota, was a traveling salesman recently removed from
Minnesota, whose work was largely in Minnesota in a car still licensed in Minnesota and
operated with a Minnesota driver's license, the Minnesota court refused to apply the
North Dakota guest statute. The case was assimilated to a precedent decision where both
parties were from Minnesota, that that state had an overriding interest in the relationship
of the parties and in the adjudication of their rights. Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441,
141 N.W.2d 526 (1966). Although the court does not discuss the matter in such terms, it is
interesting to note that a case of some difficulty-certainly not a false conflict case-is subsumed under decision in a case of false conflict.
3. Record la.
4. The complaint charges that the automobile was operated in "a negligent, careless,
reckless, wilful and wanton manner." Record 4a. The deposition of the plaintiff, however,
does not indicate that anything more than negligence could fairly be argued. It appears
that the defendant's vehicle skidded on ice and ran head-on into an oncoming automobile.
Record 20a-21a.
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of the bases of concern of the two states reveal to the court a "true
conflict." The court cannot serve two masters. The result itself cannot
be greatly complained of. A true conflict is resolved in a way that avoids
an arguably tenuous application of the better rule of law in a transitory
cause of action based on personal jurisdiction over a non-resident conveniently assumed on the occasion of a friendly rendezvous. The
decision is "safe" and the invitation to radical innovation is declined.
The route of the majority to its decision is nevertheless curious. The
reasoning is twofold, based in part on interest analysis and in part on
"territorial justice." These lines of development point to the same
result, but they appear somewhat skewed in their relationship one to
the other. The handling of the significance of the occurrence of the
accident in Delaware accounts for this imbalance. To determine which
state has the greater interest in the application of its own law the
majority purports to weigh the contacts qualitatively. After aggregating
the Delaware contacts against the sole fact that the passenger is from
Pennsylvania (balanced of course by the fact that the driver is from
Delaware), the majority treats as controlling that "it appears that
insurance rates will depend on the state in which the automobile is
housed rather than the domicile of the owner or driver." 5 Even assuming the context of the immediate law-fact pattern, keeping in mind that
the "law of the garage" is protective of the driver and insurer, the conclusion that Delaware's contacts are qualitatively greater than Pennsylvania's seems marred by the majority's next statement. "In this analysis
the fact that the accident occurred in Delaware is not a relevant contact
because the Delaware statute does not set out a rule of the road." 6 If
the place of injury is irrelevant, then the law of that place is irrelevant
as well and whether the driver enjoys the partial immunity of a guest
statute or not is in actuarial terms insignificant. Delaware would resolve
this issue according to the lex loci delicti,7 an approach insensitive to the
reckoning of insurance rates. Pennsylvania appears more solicitous of
insurers in Delaware than Delaware itself. Most states near Delaware do
not have guest statutes." If many claims of this kind against insurers in
5. 439 Pa. 556, 267 A.2d 856 (1970).
6. Id. at footnote 2.
7. Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965) (Delaware Guest and Host).
8. Only Virginia has a guest statute, CODE VA. § 8-646.1 (1957). Massachusetts has a
similar rule by decisional law. Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917).
Where recovery is sought for wrongful death, however, liability is based on ordinary
negligence. Gallup v. Lazott, 271 Mass. 406, 171 N.E. 658 (1930). Connecticut in 1927 was
the first state to enact a guest statute. It was repealed in 1937, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 540E
(Supp. 1939). The Vermont guest statute was recently repealed, VT. LAWS 1970, Ch. 194.
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Delaware arise from accidents in those states, presumably these are
figured into policy rates. If very few are presented, Pennsylvania still
seems to insist on being "more Roman than the Romans."9
In seeming paradox the majority makes large use of the fact that the
accident occurred in Delaware as it looks beyond the expectations of
insurance companies to risks fairly to be imposed upon the driver.
Professor Cavers is quoted as authority for the territorial theme which
underlies the proposition that one who acts within his home state
should not be put to the hazard of more demanding standards of conduct or higher limits of financial protection when he deals with persons
from states which provide rules of compensation more favorable to
plaintiffs.10 Professor Cavers' principles of preference are an admirable
blend of domiciliary (relational) and territorial indexes for the choiceof-law process, but the present fact situation is at one remove from the
situations upon which he has expressly articulated his views. In so
taking Professor Cavers, the majority makes a rule out of what is
intended as a principle of preference, thus making universal what is
intended to be typical. Professor Cavers has argued for a case by case
development of doctrine in elaboration of his principles of preference.
What is now objected to is the paucity of reasoning in the opinion to
show a rationalized connection between the event and the choice-of-law
principle assumed to control the issue arising out of it. While the
reliance of the majority upon Professor Cavers' views is supportable by
inference or implication, it is not demanded by any express statement.',
This is not the same case as when a Pennsylvania resident strikes up
a guest-host relationship with a Delaware resident for a ride between
points in Delaware. Here, just as it may be said that the plaintiff has
exposed himself to the operation of the Delaware guest statute by
accepting a ride there, so it may be said that the Delaware driver has
9. Cf. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 621 (1951).
10. D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS (1965). The case at hand is deemed to be
governed by Professor Cavers' second principle of preference:
2. Where the liability laws of the state in which the defendant acted and caused
an injury set a lower standard of conduct or of financial protection than do the
laws of the home state of the person suffering the injury, the laws of the state of
conduct and injury should determine the standard of conduct or protection applicable to the case, at least where the person injured was not so related to the
person causing the injury that the question should be relegated to the law governing
the relationship.
Id. at 46.
11. The following variant of Cipolla could be assimilated to a hypothetical case presented
by Professor Cavers. Suppose the driver had picked up the passenger at home in Pennsylvania and the accident had happened after they entered Delaware on their way to school.
Presumably Professor Cavers would apply Delaware law. Cf. id. at 154 n20 and accompanying text.
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exposed himself to the potential operation of the regime of ordinary
negligence by agreeing to take the plaintiff home to Pennsylvania. Thus
viewed, the decision turns on the conjunction of the accident happening
in Delaware and the driver being domiciled there, facts given no controlling importance in the first part of the opinion.
In fairness to the majority it may be conceded that elements of the
law-fact pattern which point to reasonable protection of insurance
interests need not be the same elements as points to reasonable protection of the driver. Given the premises assumed, it is fortunate that both
aspects of the case indicate the same choice of law. But what of the cases
where these lines of analysis point to differing rules of law, as when the
place of garage and insurance and the place of injury inflicted by a
domiciliary are not the same. Professor Cavers's principle of preference
would still point to the second while the majority would be left in conflict with itself. Such a conflict presumably would be resolved as
suggested from Professor Cavers because the driver is legally the defendant of interest, notwithstanding that the insurer is probably holding
the financial bag.
That a territorial view seems preferable to a personal view may be so
but, in Cipolla v. Shaposka such an observation distorts important
features of the case. Certain it is that territorialism in the form of the
lex loci delicti principle is on the wane.'12 Departures from the First
Restatement in tort cases have been made by relegating issues not
bearing upon conduct to the law of the seat of the relationship or the
common domicile of the parties. 13 A personal view is not available in
Cipolla v. Shaposka because such affiliating circumstances are divided
12. Since the landmark decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 NXE.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), the lex loci delicti rule has
increasingly been abandoned. "In a short time, the District of Columbia and at least 21
states have rejected the place-of-wrong rule in some context, usually in a court decision
revealing general acceptance of the premises of state-interest analysis." R. WEINTRAuB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws, 234 (1971) (footnote containing citations by jurisdiction omitted). See also Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 603 (1970). It is interesting to note that
Justice Roberts, who dissents in Cipolla v. Shaposka, is the writer of the opinion in which
Pennsylvania breaks with the lex loci delicti rule, Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1,
203 A.2d 796 (1964).
13. A case illustrating the simultaneous adoption of a domiciliary reference and the
reformulation of domestic law to achieve a better rule is Baits v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142
N.W.2d 66 (1966). In a case involving a suit between a Minnesota parent and child arising
out of an accident in Wisconsin, the court decided that this was "a matter of family law
rather than tort law" and proceeded to rule prospectively that the parent-child immunity
should no longer be a defense. Id. at 425, 142 N.W.2d at 70. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 169 (Proposed Official Draft, Part II, 1968). Although the Second
Restatement does not treat the guest-host problem specifically by section, the influence of
Babcock is evident generally and in particular in Section 145, Comment e, Illustration 1.
The law-fact pattern of Cipolla v. Shaposka is not treated.
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between the two states. Domiciliary references here are not of independent importance. Delaware as a domiciliary contact supports a territorial
resolution. Pennsylvania as a domiciliary contact supports a better rule
of law resolution, and the general obligation of the forum to serve the
policies of its own State.1 4 Thus, the real conflict in the case is between
territorial fairness and the better rule of law.
The real importance of Cipolla v. Shaposka is that these themes are
in conflict and that there is argument as well as merit on both sides.15
The argument of the dissent is candidly that Pennsylvania law should
apply its own better rule of law. That the dissent is more than a resultoriented cry in the wilderness and must be taken seriously is indicated
by agreement on both sides that Cipolla v. Shaposka presents a true
conflict, making defensable the application of the law of either concerned jurisdiction. The resolution of true conflicts may be seen as an
exercise in comparative reasonableness. To say that a decision one way
is wise is not to imply that a decision the other way is a wrong headed
insistence on the better seeming law of an unconcerned or little concerned jurisdiction. Further, the resolution of a true conflict readily invites a comparison of the intrinsic merits of the laws in conflict, not a
comparison which disregards the bases of concern of the states involved,
14. The application of the lex fori as such, in the absence of a common domiciliary
reference and unsupported by better law considerations, would not seem to outweigh
territorial considerations in this case where connecting factors variously viewed as individually controlling are collected in one place. Where parties are domiciled in different
states Professor Ehrenzweig has profferred a "law of the garage" rule as reasonable to allow
insurance planning by the host. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLiCr OF LAws, 580-81 (1962). See also
Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of Enterprise
Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 1, 69 Yale L.J. 595 (1960). On the
premise, however, that the insurer does not calculate his premium in this manner, a better
rule approach which points to the law of the forum may suit Professor Ehrenzweig.
Although the "better rule" principle is not generally capable of replacing conflicts
rules, I see little justification within the limits set by settled law for the prevailing
horror against the recognition of that principle as one of many determining the
growth of conflicts laws.
Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in Multi-State
Tort Law, 53 VA. L. RaV. 847, 855 (1967).
15. In Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966) (New Hampshire husband and
wife motoring between two points in New Hampshire involved in accident in Vermont), a
false conflict was presented, and the rejection of the Vermont guest statute in favor of
New Hampshire's rule of ordinary negligence was dearly indicated. Reliance on the
better rule of law consideration in this case has been called unnecessary. See Baade,
Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choiceof-Law Process, 46 TEx. L. REv. 141, 152-156 (1967). Professor Cavers has answered charges
that his landmark article of a generation ago, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem,
47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933), advocated an ad hoc preference for "better rules". See D.
CAVERs, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PRoCEss 8-10, 75-81 (1965). It is ironic that as a better rule
concept is more candidly accepted as an influence in the choice-of-law process-certainly
more desirable than covert devices such as characterization and manipulation of choice-oflaw rules-"justice in the individual case" may assume larger proportions than Professor
Cavers intended or intends.
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but a comparison which can assume a detached perspective because the
bases of concern are keenly divided.
To view more clearly the conflict of themes presented here the choiceof-law process must be seen at several operating levels. The choice-oflaw process can be seen as bearing upon the legal system, its institutions,
and the way laws are formulated and applied. At one level the choiceof-law process may operate to correct and improve the way in which the
whole range of multi-state problems is handled intergovernmentally
and institutionally. Thus, in discussing the choice-influencing considerations operating in the choice-of-law process, Professor Leflar argues
that solutions to multi-state problems should contribute to interstate
harmony, predictability and certainty, and simplification of the judicial
task. 16 That the application of Delaware law here conduces to greater
interstate harmony can be argued. But the application of Pennsylvania
law would have to be seen as a blow against federalism before it could
be seriously complained of on this point. Such argument seems better
suited to cases involving foreign countries in matters of national interest, political or commercial. 17 Here the parties are from different states
and the issue is not one which strikes at the sovereignty of Delaware in
the policing of automobile traffic on its highways. Predictability and
certainty are useful, but modern scholarship-judicial and academichas found them to be elusive values in the choice-of-law process, and of
questionable importance in unplanned events such as the automobile
accident. Insurance companies, for the most part the real defendants,
cannot claim unfair surprise in an age when multi-state automobile
traffic has become commonplace. Of the simplification of the judicial
task, little need be said. A trial of the issue of negligence is probably
simpler than a trial on the issue of gross negligence, which requires as
16. Professor Leflar identifies the following choice-influencing considerations:
(A) Predictability of results;
(B) Maintenance of interstate and international order;
(C) Simplification of the judicial task;
(D) Advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
(E) Application of the better rule of law.
R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcTs LAW 245 (1969).
17. In support of his second "principle of preference," giving to the one who causes
injury at home the benefit of laws of his home state which are more protective of him,
Professor Cavers cites two cases involving fatal air crashes in Brazil. Armiger v. Real S.A.
Transportes Aereos, 377 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1967) and Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Cavers, Comments on Reich v.
Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 647, 652 n.21 (1968). Those cases emphasize governmental
interests as interests of national policy to the Brazilian government. The decisions are political
in a sense well beyond that comprehended by the use of the term "governmental interest"
to indicate that events and transactions involving private persons are generally subject to
the laws of the state where they occur.
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well a determination of who is a guest, and the avoidance of any trial
at all by the application of a guest statute does not purchase the kind
of simplification which is at stake in the choice-of-law process.
On the points of implementation of the policies and purposes of the
area of law involved and of securing the better rule of law we find the
choice-of-law process operating at the level of solution of discrete controversies on the merits as to claims presented by the parties. The
question raised is to what extent should the choice-of-law process as a
system for managing the relationships between states and as a mechanism
for securing the better working of legal institutions be subordinated to
the solution of the controversy which motivated or precipitated the
action. It is a classroom axiom that private persons do not go to law
for the purpose of testing interstate relationships or of proving the
integrity of legal institutions, certainly not in the matter of an
automobile accident. The plaintiff seeks some private redress and the
defendant refuses to accede voluntarily. Stated otherwise, the question
is when can or ought the choice-of-law process to view the controversy
on the merits as the object of decision in some sense other than as a
matter to be allocated to the local law of one or another concerned
jurisdiction.
In his dissenting opinion Justice Roberts argues that Pennsylvania's
rule of ordinary negligence ought to apply because Pennsylvania is a
concerned jurisdiction with a better rule of law. The argument should
be that an otherwise appropriately applicable rule of law is better
because this is a multi-state case. This makes the choice-of-law process a
force for fashioning dispositive rules in developing a common system of
multi-state rules. The obvious effect is the expansion by the participating forums of seemingly better rules at the expense of localizing seemingly inferior rules, forensically as well as territorially. The choice
influencing consideration of advancement of the forum's governmental
interest strengthens this prospect and further undercuts the territorial
theme qua territorial.
Indeed the multi-state nature of the case is not fully developed in any
of the opinions. It is true that contacts in the two states are presented
and weighed in the light of differing laws and policies with respect to
the issue, but the guest-host relationship is seen as split between the two
states rather than as a multi-state relationship. This trip is a venture
planned as a multi-state event or transaction. It was intended to cross
state lines. To say that the defendant acted only within his home state is
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to obscure this point. The defendant may be from Delaware and his
conduct causing the injury may have occurred there, but the planned
transaction was to extend to and have its end in Pennsylvania, the
defendant having the further private motive to retrieve tools which he
had loaned to the plaintiff.' 8 That the accident happened in Delaware
is not exactly fortuitous, but Pennsylvania is as likely a spot, given the
planned ride across state lines. 19 The analogy presented is as in the case
of consensual arrangements where the proposition that in multi-state
cases the arrangements should be upheld if this can be done fairly has
much influence impliedly if not expressly.20 There is indicated in the
field of torts a principle of alternative reference to secure the "socially
2
favored arrangement." '
For Justice Roberts, then, the better rule of law concept, is a second
level consideration, to be given account of only after all else has failed.
Although Professor Cavers has come to see the principles of preference
as more than "tie breakers" for choice-of-law problems as to which a
policy or interest analysis will not indicate a single or predominantly
concerned jurisdiction,2 2 Justice Roberts relegates better rule of law
considerations to that function:
It must be remembered, however, that it is only because I believe
that Delaware and Pennsylvania, on the basis of relevant contacts,
are equally concerned that I feel free to choose either jurisdiction's
law.
This serves the end that the choice-of-law process should operate to
regulate and harmonize the effect of and to establish the reasonable
reach of state laws, but it masks the fact that in this case it is difficult to
18. Deposition of M.F. Cipolla, Record 21a.
19. A look at a map will show that a ride of any distance out of Delaware generally
and Wilmington in particular, will take one into a neighboring state without a guest
statute. Delaware's lex loci delicti rule, Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965), as has
been noted, thus functions to avoid the application of the guest statute, even in a case
where both parties are from Delaware. "One is tempted to call this a 'better law' decision."
Baade, supra note 12 at 146 n.30 "This reasoning alone can also justify seemingly
mechanical adherence to a foreign lex loci in preference over the forum's own guest
statute." (Citing Friday). A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL 2d., 257-258 (1970).
20. On the principle of validation ("lex validitatis") see A. EHRFNZWEIC, CONFLICT Or
LAws, 465 et seq. (1962).
21. Cf. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Ray.
267, 284, 295-304 (1966). The phrase is Professor Leflar's. The indicated "rule of compensation" is developed in Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflicts Problems-Torts, 48
CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963).
22. As principles of preference are elaborated on a case by case basis, would they not
come to embody analyses by which conflicts have hitherto been resolved or dismissed as
false? At a recent Round Table at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools (December 28, 1969) Professor Cavers allowed that principles of preference might
have use beyond the resolution of true conflicts. I think my memory is correct in this.
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see that the governmental interests of the forum can be avoided in the
case of a true conflict where the better rule is the home rule. The sum
of the functions of the guest statute and of ordinary negligence rules
can be thought of in terms of good or bad irrespective of multi-state
considerations. Policies of compensation, risk distribution, loss allocation, injury compensation, as opposed to policies of avoidance of ingratitude and collusion are preferable as such, and to the extent that
these policies are of multi-state dimension, it is unquestionable that the
multi-state rule would implement them and relegate the policies relating to collusion and ingratitude to case by case institutional scrutiny
and private arrangement. Thus viewed no properly concerned jurisdiction in a multi-state case would ever apply a guest statute.
Quite evidently, this approach requires some rethinking of what is a
multi-state guest-host case. That the parties are from different states
would not be enough as such to make a case more than nominally multistate. The event or transaction must have a significantly multi-state
dimension. Cipolla v. Shaposka is arguably such a case. Thus, notwithstanding the fact of the accident in Delaware, the venture is a DelawarePennsylvania undertaking: a transaction involving persons from different states intending to cross state lines. The state affiliations of the
parties and the states comprehended by the undertaking would largely
mark out the concerned states. If the transitory or ambush feature of in
personam jurisdiction were removed, the bases of adjudicatory jurisdiction would provide the occasion for the free application of the better
rule of law in the choice-of-law process.
The major objection to the better rule of law approach is not in
applying the better of two rules of law, but the difficulty in rationalizing
which is better. Seldom is either of the competing rules of no redeeming
quality. Even in Cipolla the rejection of the Delaware guest statute,
argued for by Justice Roberts, can't quite be justified in such terms. As
a better rule case Cipolla is easy, but what of the distinctions more difficult to resolve? There is the further problem of who is to decide which
is the better rule of law. The better rule of law is inevitably a lex fori
determination. 23 As such, it is perhaps best preserved for so called true
23. "All other considerations being the same . . . , we would apply the law of a nonforum state if it were the better law." Zelinger v. State Sand and Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d
98, 113, 156 N.W.2d 466, 473 (1968). A decision on this express ground is wanting, one
suspects, not because courts are parochial in a pejorative sense, but because a court faced
with such a choice may prefer to choose its own law as a matter of choice of law and
then reform its domestic law. This, however, may be impossible where local law is
statutory.
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conflict cases as a guide to choice of law. As a guide to the assessment of
concerns it might prove mischievous-as substituting of the forum's
view of what another jurisdiction's policies are or ought to be.
If a better rule of law approach is taken in a case like Cipolla, the rule
for the case ought to be closely responsive to the reasons why the forum
thinks the rule selected is better. Justice Roberts opts for negligence
liability in the driver. One reason is that insurance coverage is pervasive.
Automobile liability insurance rates are generally set upon the basis
of the volume of claims rather than upon the vagaries of local law. 24
Besides, insurance is a matter of contract and adjustment to local
peculiarities can be accomplished beforehand. 25 It is doubtful that these
exceptions to the general regime of negligence law, which are becoming
more curious as time goes on, can have much impact on the rate of
policy premiums. But this goes only to liability within insurance limits.
It is instructive to note that the damages claimed hardly exceed the
compulsory liability minimum coverages required by the laws of Delaware and Pennsylvania. 26 To this point, it cannot be said that the driver
has been unfairly put to the hazard of dealing with the passenger from
an ordinary negligence state. And his insurance company must be held
to accept the hazard of varying state laws by doing business in insuring
cars which are known to cross state lines. Where damages exceed policy
limits, however, it is harder to escape the pull of territorial allocation
of law-making responsibility. If the particularity suggested cannot or
will not be achieved by the court, then it may finally have to be admitted that the guest-host problem is not important enough an occasion
for breaking down state boundaries.
24. See McNamara, Automobile Liability Insurance Rates, 35 Ins. Counsel J. 398 (1968).
25. Compare, N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(3) (McKinney 1966), which, in response to the
abrogation of interspousal immunity, provides with respect to liability insurance that no
policy "shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured because of death of
injuries to his or her spouse . . . unless express provision . . . is included in the policy."
This protection may not obtain in a multi-state case. In an automobile accident in
Pennsylvania involving local spouses in one car and New York spouses in the other, the
insurer was not permitted to deny coverage after a judgment of contribution for the driver
of the other car against the New York spouse of the injured party, despite the absence of
express coverage. Goulding v. Sands, 237 F. Supp. 577 (W.D. Pa. 1965). The decision was
affirmed on the more satisfying ground of estoppel to deny coverage after management of
the insured's defense. Goulding v. Sands, 355 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1966). See also Haines v.
Mid-Century Insurance Co., 47 Wis. 2d 442, 177 N.W.2d 328 (1970) (Forum statute
declaring family-exclusion clauses to be invalid applied to override exclusion clause in
policy issued in state where exclusion is upheld according to decisional law).
26. The complaint alleges damages "in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars." Record 7a. In
case of bodily injury to or death of one person, Pennsylvania requires coverage of not
less than $10,000, 75 P.S. Section 1404 (1960); in such case Delaware also requires $10,000,
21 Del. Code Section 2904 (Supp. 1968).
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